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Case Note
Insider Trading and the Dual Role of
Information
United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
I
James H. O'Hagan-accused of insider trading-is escaping conviction
with over $4 million of questionable trading profits. In United States v.
O'Hagan,' the Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory of insider
trading and, in doing so, removed the legal foundation on which O'Hagan was
convicted of securities fraud.2 Besides enriching O'Hagan, the decision
aggravated a growing circuit split over the misappropriation theory: Accepted
by four circuits, the theory has now been rejected by two.3 The government
has petitioned for a rehearing en banc. Whatever the outcome of that
petition-and any rehearing that may follow-it is likely that one of the parties
will appeal to the Supreme Court, which deadlocked four to four in its only
previous consideration of the misappropriation theory.5 Thus, O'Hagan
presents an opportunity to resolve two splits: one among the circuits and
another among the Justices.
1. 92 .3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
2. See id. The Eighth Circuit's decision requires that the government return to O'Hagan his disgorged
profits. See SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1466. 1475 (D. Minn. 1995) The Eighth Circuit also
invalidated Rule 14e-3 and reversed O'Hagan's conviction thereunder See O'Hogan. 92 F3d at 622; 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1996). Despite its significance, the Eighth Circuit's invalidation of Rule 14c-3 is
beyond the scope of this Case Note.
3. The Fourth Circuit has also rejected the misappropnation theory- See United States v Bryan. 58
F.3d 933, 949 (4th Cir. 1995). The Second. Third. Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have accepted it See SEC
v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark. 915 F.2d 439. 449-50 (9th Cir. 1990).
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v Newman, 664 F2d 12. 16-17
(2d Cir. 1981).
4. See Karen Donovan, Is SEC Tool for Policing Insider Trading at Risk ". NAT't LJ . Sept 30. 1996.
at B1, BI.
5. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19. 24 (1987) (decided after Justice Powell retired but
before Justice Kennedy took his seat); see also Chiarella v. United States. 445 US 222. 235-37 (1980)
(refusing to consider misappropriation theory because it was not properly presented to jury)
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No matter what the courts decide in O'Hagan, final resolution of the
controversy surrounding insider trading awaits a coherent policy rationale that
would simultaneously support and limit insider trading liability. Several
commentators have offered promising analyses that treat insider trading cases
as information cases. I argue in this Case Note that these "information
analyses" suffer from a serious deficiency: They fail to account for the dual
role of information in our economy.
II
The O'Hagan litigation grew out of Grand Met PLC's takeover of
Pillsbury Company. In July 1988, Grand Met retained the law firm of Dorsey
& Whitney, of which O'Hagan was a partner. O'Hagan learned of the
impending takeover and purchased call options for Pillsbury stock. When
Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer in October 1988, O'Hagan
exercised his options, earning over $4 million. He was subsequently convicted
on fifty-seven counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering.6
On the basis of his criminal convictions, the SEC ordered O'Hagan to disgorge
his profits.7 The Eighth Circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory
relieved O'Hagan of criminal liability and reimbursed his profits.
The vitality of the misappropriation theory depends upon whether it is
supported by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.8 Section 10(b)
prohibits manipulation and deception in the securities market. However, neither
section 10(b) nor Rule l0b-5 9-promulgated by the SEC under section
10(b)-provides significant guidance as to what constitutes "deception."'"
Traditionally, courts have described "deception" in the context of insider
trading" as a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by corporate management
to shareholders.' 2 The SEC developed the misappropriation theory as a means
of reaching section 10(b) violators not covered by the conventional analysis.
Under this theory, section 10(b) "is violated when a person (1) misappropriates
material nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a
relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities
transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders
of the traded stock."'1
3
The O'Hagan court found that the misappropriation theory required too
6. See O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. at 1462-64.
7. See id. at 1474-76.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also cases cited supra notes 2-3.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I Ob-5 (1996).
10. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
"manipulation" is term of art inapplicable to insider trading).
11. I use "insider trading" to refer to trading on material nonpublic information.
12. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980).
13. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
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broad an interpretation of "deception." Specifically, the court held: (1) that
"deception" under section 10(b) requires either misrepresentation or
nondisclosure in violation of a duty to disclose;" and (2) that if liability is
premised on nondisclosure, the underlying duty to disclose must be owed to
the purchasers or sellers of the securities in question. ' For the first
proposition, the court relied upon Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.'6 In
Santa Fe, the Supreme Court stated that the language of section 10(b) "gives
no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception," and therefore a claim of fraud and fiduciary breach
is actionable under Rule lOb-5 "only if the conduct alleged can be fairly
viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute."' 7
For the second proposition, the court relied upon Chiarella v. United States."
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court held that section 10(b) liability "is premised
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction."'9 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
misappropriation theory because: (1) it permits the imposition of liability
without a particularized showing of misrepresentation or nondisclosure; and (2)
it permits liability for a breach of duty owed to parties who are unconnected
to the disputed securities transaction.2'
Circuits that have adopted the misappropriation theory do not engage these
aspects of Santa Fe and Chiarella. Instead, they rely on United States v.
Newman,2 1 in which the Second Circuit concluded that Rule 10b-5-and
therefore section 10(b)-"contains no specific requirement that fraud be
perpetrated upon the seller or buyer of securities."22 The Second Circuit based
its decision on a series of circuit court opinions predating Chiarella,' 3 and did
not cite Chiarella in this context despite its citation by the district court.
The Eighth Circuit resisted the temptation to adopt the misappropriation
theory, but at a price: O'Hagan is getting away. To many, this result seems
plainly unfair. 5 Yet, "[ilf arguments about fairness are to be more than
discussion stoppers, they must have some content. 2 6 This is precisely the
14. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617-18.
15. See id. at 618-19.
16. 430 U.S. 462 (1977), cited in O'Hagan. 92 F.3d at 618.
17. Id. at 473-74; see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank. 114 S Ct 1439. 1446 (1994). Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
18. 445 U.S. 222 (1980), cited in O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618-19.
19. Id. at 230 (emphasis added); see also Central Bank. 114 S. Ct. at 1455: Dirks. 463 U S at 657-58
20. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618.
21. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 17. Rule lOb-5 cannot encompass more than its statutory enabler.
23. See id. (citing cases).
24. See United States v. Courtois, 1981 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98.024. at 91.289 (S.D.N.Y. June
5, 1981).
25. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 628 (describing O'Hagan's conduct as "unethical and immoral-).
26. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading. Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges. and the Production
of Information, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 309. 323.
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point at which the jurisprudence fails: The case law lacks a coherent policy
rationale that would otherwise serve to demarcate section 10(b) liability and
order our normative expectations. Some commentators have attempted to
remedy this problem by treating insider trading cases as information cases.27
However, because these commentators fail to acknowledge the dual role of
information in our economy, their analyses fail to maximize market efficiency,
systematize section 10(b) liability, or disambiguate our moral intuitions.
II
Information28 plays a dual role in our economy. First, it drives the pricing
mechanism essential to economic efficiency. When market prices incorporate
all relevant information, the market allocates resources optimally and corporate
managers make efficient production decisions.29 Second, information is a
commodity, produced and bargained for within the market structure.30
Information is gathered only when it is cost effective to do so, i.e., when its
market value exceeds its cost of production. To capture this value, the producer
of information must restrict its availability.
3'
The challenge lies in the tension between these two roles of information.
Because more information means greater economic efficiency, we would all
be better off if information were "free, complete, instantaneous, and universally
available. ''3 2 However, market participants have no incentive to produce
information unless they are allowed to profit from its production. This profit
is a transaction cost, undermining economic efficiency.33 Thus, as one
commentator has remarked, "[t]o postulate efficiency in the production of
information, we must assume away the incentive necessary to produce. To
postulate the incentive is to make efficiency impossible.
34
27. See, e.g., BERNHARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIABILITY IN THE USA AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
175-85 (1991); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.12 (1986); Easterbrook, supra note 26.
at 310, 314-39.
28. "In the broadest sense, information is data that has the capacity to alter one's beliefs about the
world or, in our more limited context, one's beliefs about the appropriate price of an asset." Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. Ray. 549, 561 (1984).
29. See CLARK, supra note 27, at § 8.2.3; Mark Rubinstein, Securities Market Efficiency in an Arrow-
Debreu Economy, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 812, 812 (1975); cf Randall Morck et al., The Stock Market and
Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow?, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 157 (1990).
30. See James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1443 (1992).
31. Both roles of information appear in the case law, but never in the same opinion. See, e.g., Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) (discussing efficiency role); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing commodity role).
32. Boyle, supra note 30, at 1443.
33. See id. at 1445.
34. Id.; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405 (1980) ("There is a fundamental conflict between the
efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information.").
1328 [Vol. 106: 1325
Case Note
If this discussion makes the situation seem hopeless, it need not. This
tension is not peculiar to the securities market; analogous concerns exist in the
context of intellectual property. Copyright law, for example, "trades off the
costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives
to create the work in the first place. ' 35 Adopting an analogous posture in the
securities context, Congress should weigh the efficiency gains of free
information against the efficiency losses of either: (1) paying for information,
by allowing information producers to profit by trading without disclosure; or
(2) failing to motivate production. This dual information approach would
accord with and rationalize section 10(b) jurisprudence as it now applies to
corporate insiders (liable for insider trading) and market analysts (not liable).
It would also resolve the controversy presented by O'Hagan, providing a
principled means of extending insider trading liability to outsiders now covered
only by the misappropriation theory.
We begin by partitioning investors into two classes: (1) those who are
motivated by potential trading profits to gather new information; and (2) those
whose production of new information is insensitive to the availability of
trading profits. We shall refer to the first class as diligent searchers. The
second class is residual. Diligent searchers gather information until the
marginal cost of doing so is equal to their marginal trading profits. Residual
class members gather the same amount of information regardless of trading
opportunities. This class includes at least two kinds of people: (a) corporate
insiders, who gather new information in the course of fulfilling their
management duties; and (b) certain outsiders-tippees and eavesdroppers-who
do not produce new information but instead intercept the information of others.
By definition, imposing on the residual class a duty to disclose all material
nonpublic information would have no deleterious effect on the amount of
information available to the market.37 Although it would disseminate much
information, there are two problems with such an uncompromising duty. First,
corporate insiders may have legitimate business reasons for delaying
disclosure.38 Second, such a rule would impose on an unsuspecting public
liability for the mere possession of inside information.39 Consequently, a
35. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law. IS J LEGAL
STUD. 325, 326 (1989). Boyle endorses this approach to intellectual property but warns that the tension may
reappear within the balancing scheme. See Boyle, supra note 30. at 1447-48.
36. The term "diligent searcher" is borrowed from Clark. see CLARK. supro note 27. § 8 12,2. who
makes a distinction similar to that drawn here, but fails to consider the cost to market efficiency of allowing
searchers to capture the value of their work.
37. Investors owning more than five percent of the stock of a public company arc already required
to make certain disclosures, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994); 17 C.ER. § 240.13d-I (1996). as is anyone
making a tender offer for a public company, see 15 U.S.C. 78n(d); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3.
38. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (sanctioning use of "no comment" to
protect confidentiality of pending merger negotiations in case emphasizing importance of disclosure).
39. Such a result is clearly unjust in the context of a criminal prosecution. See. e.g., Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) ("Where a person did not know of [al duty and where there was
no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.")
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disclose-or-abstain rule may be the best alternative.40 This rule already applies
to corporate insiders;41 we need only extend it to the other members of the
residual class. Extending the rule permits residual class members in possession
of inside information to keep it in confidence, provided they do not trade on
it. If they want to trade, they must disclose.
If the amount of information disseminated by the residual class is sub-
optimal, i.e., the positive contribution to market efficiency of additional
information outweighs the negative effect of paying for its production, then we
should permit diligent searchers to trade without disclosure. 4 The information
they produce will be disseminated, through the medium of market prices, in
two ways. First, their buying and selling will move market prices toward their
informed values. 43 Second, other investors will mimic their trades,
accelerating the rate at which information is impounded in market prices.4
There are three advantages to this approach. First, it deliberately and self-
consciously maximizes efficiency, taking into account the dual role of
information.45 Second, it provides a principled means of both imposing and
limiting insider trading liability. Finally, it orders our expectations concerning
the behavior of market participants and-once familiar-will cause our moral
intuitions about insider trading to track section 10(b) liability.
Returning to United States v. O'Hagan, the dual information approach
would, if implemented by Congress, provide a principled means of imposing
section 10(b) liability. Since denying trading privileges to O'Hagan would have
no effect on his production of information, O'Hagan would be a member of
the residual class and therefore subject to the disclose-or-abstain rule. As a
result, his possession of material nonpublic information would trigger a duty
to disclose or abstain. Because O'Hagan traded without disclosure, his silence
would constitute "deception" under section 10(b). Thus, once we account for
the dual role of information, O'Hagan is guilty of insider trading. As for his
$4 million: Easy come, easy go.
-Jonathan E.A. ten Oever
40. The disclose-or-abstain rule will cause the disclosure of material nonpublic information if persons
disclosing it have an opportunity to trade before the market fully impounds the information disclosed.
However, this information forcing effect has been challenged. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 327.
If persons disclosing material nonpublic information could not earn trading profits exceeding the costs of
disclosure, it may be advantageous to grant the residual class limited trading privileges. See infra note 44.
41. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
42. Market analysts--the paradigmatic diligent searchers-already enjoy a safe harbor from section
10(b) liability. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
43. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 28, at 574-76 (explaining "price decoding").
44. See id. at 572-79 (explaining "trade decoding"). It might be advantageous to formalize the diligent
searchers' trading priveleges in a manner analogous to copyright protection. The government could then
manipulate the amount of available information by adjusting the extent or temporal duration of the trading
privilege. Cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (1994) (establishing copyright protection and duration thereof).
45. Contrast the conventional judicial analysis, which focuses on the fiduciary duty of corporate
insiders to shareholders. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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